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The Art of Deception and the Role of Intelligence Education

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Abstract

Is deception an art? And if so, what role might it have in military intelligence education? To offer some answers to these questions, the paper draws upon the discovery phase of efforts to synchronize deception theory, research, practice, in order to develop a post-graduate military deception course for a military intelligence studies. In doing so, it reflects upon the recognition afforded from discovery to creativity, innovation, science, doctrine, and ethics, within the studies of deception and the construct of military deception itself. It follows with bridge building between theory and practice through the adaptive use of Boyds Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) and a target centric intelligence approach to explain the dynamics concerning military intelligence in warfighting. These initial findings suggest that deception, as part of a post-graduate military intelligence education, not only has sufficient philosophy of science facets to bear a post-graduate level course, it has unique qualities that facilitate the role intelligence education might have in managing it.



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All warfare is based on deception.
SunTzu, The Art of War¹

Introduction

When the Russian Federation invaded the Crimea, it seemed almost surrealistic that for weeks major news outlets such as CNN and BBC on the ground, were unable to confirm or deny whether the masked soldiers without identification insignias were part of the Russian Armed Forces. Eventually after a week or two there was certainly little doubt left, but a week or two was more than enough for the purposes of the military operation – annexation ‘fait accompli.’² The decisiveness of the deception operation attached to the actions on the Crimea, involved more than the simply determination of a single commander. It required military strategy, organisation, and doctrine, in order to drive their intelligence, operations, logistics, and information operational planners. Though on a far smaller scale than D-DAY, the bridge between the theory and practice of deception in order to produce the ‘fait accompli,’ was just as important to the outcome of the Crimea operation, as was Operation Fortitude³ was to ensure the establishment of defendable beachheads in Normandy on D-Day, in WWII.

The study of the effective application of deception in war is definitely not new, nor is the recognition afforded to the contribution of the military intelligence and operational planning apparatus to deception. It is certainly not without substantial historic documentation. However considering the strategic role and decisive points in human history associated with deception,

¹ Tzu, Sun. The Art of War. trans. Samuel B. Griffith. London: Oxford University Press, 1963. Pg.66-67.

² Thompson, Mark (17 April 2014). "[The 600 Years of History Behind Those Ukrainian Masks](#)". [Time magazine](#). Retrieved 27 February 2016

³ WWI Allied deception operation designed to convince the German military command that Allied forces would land at Pas de Calais and not Normandy beaches.



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and Sun Tzu's absolutist declaration that all warfare is based on deception, deception appears to be under represented in the common array of expected post-graduate military intelligence studies programs. At the start of this discovery process, our starting impression was that deception might not be able to bare a sufficient art or science attribution, worthy of deeper post-graduate focus. Particularly where it concerns engaging philosophy of science for the management of uncertainty.⁴


Discerning the degree to which deception is worthy of post-graduate military intelligence focus first required that it could bare, as a concept, a complex degree of synchronization between theory, research, practice and education. Moreover that it would have to bare post-graduate reflection on the science and the art, engaging the innovation and creativity historically associated with military deception planning. The second requirement for Danish Defence was that the theory must bridge to practice - and that means 'warfighting.' Theoretical reflections in our post-graduate courses for joint operational planning, must also provide a clear impact on processes of warfighting itself via relevant doctrine, organisation, and technology. In this regard, it would require the isolation of the deception concept within the doctrinal responsibilities of military intelligence as a joint function for operational planning in the battlespace. A requirement that requires synthesis with a great deal of existing doctrinal granularity for warfighting processes. In short, our officers must not only be able take the theory from the post-graduate course, they must also be able to convert their theoretical knowledge to actions that give advantages in 21st century battlespaces.

⁴ Webb, Keith. Introduction to Problems in the Philosophy of Social Sciences, Punter Pub. Ltd. UK, 1995.



After a brief description of the existing academic Danish military intelligence training program into which we will eventually try to integrate deception courses, the first part of the paper will highlight the discovery process so far as it concerns the philosophy of science, and the study of deception as a both a science and an art. The second part of the paper tackles the granularity issue with regards to the role of deception in the generic dynamics of warfighting within a Danish doctrinal context. It will focus on the understanding how deception engages the operational planning processes in warfare from a more doctrinal standpoint using an adaption of Boyds OODA loop to communicate the dynamics of deception in warfare from a military intelligence perspective. It closes with an example that links social theory to practice, specifically the application of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) planning in within the battlespace dynamics of deception.

Fig. 1.0 Current Concept of Military Deception Courses





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The Danish Military Intelligence Education Program

Hard lessons learned from experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan drove the current renaissance period for military intelligence education in Denmark. Between 2011 and the present, Danish Defence has established an intelligence education and training program that strives to synchronize theory, research, education, and practice with an ever increasing granularity and higher theoretical foundations. The re-invigoration was designed to simultaneously attack the bottom and top layers of the relevant commands, in order to force a resolution of long standing cultural schism between operational planners and intelligence. Though far more complicated than it sounds, we worked to establish broad consensus around the following edict “Operations will be Commander lead, and intelligence driven.”⁵ The fundamental change this brought about was a realisation that intelligence was a tool to support the Commander in deciding what actions – operations – were needed in order to generate the desired effects in the battlespace. For many decades intelligence was seen only as something to support a plan - once the plan was made. It is into this organisational history, culture, and structure, that initial efforts are now currently underway to add post-graduate level deception courses managed by the military intelligence educational apparatus.

⁵ Discussions concerning intelligence led vs. Intelligence driven are settled in Danish Defence though not yet applied and practiced across the complete spectrum – however there is broad acceptance that all military operations are to be intelligence driven and Commander led.



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PART 1 – The Science and Art of Military Deception

There have been works examining the relationship between deception and military operations, in fact, it is by enlarge the strongest epistemological representation of deception literature. Levels of granularity are also well varied, from various joint publications, field manuals, and working papers to broader theoretical pieces discerning principles and axioms. Building theories of deception with sufficient depth for a post-graduate course is still in its infancy, however Barton Whaley will eventually likely known as one of the epistemological ‘beachhead’ contributors to deception studies. His works⁶ stretch back to the 1980’s and the era of Amos Perlmutter, vocalizing one of the first academic visions for a general theory of deception. Though not by any means sufficient on their own, his works still represent a landmark attempt to develop a general theory of deception. It would not be until James D. Monroe’s fantastic 2012 work, *Deception: Theory and Practice*⁷, on behalf of the U.S. Naval Post-Graduate School that such focused and convincing scholarship would once again be applied to the study of deception. Other contributors whose works support the ascension of deception theory to post-graduate level include Handle,⁸ Cadwell⁹, Latimer,¹⁰ Heuer,¹¹ and Dewar,¹² to name a few, and we expect to find many more in the current discovery phase. However, for the

⁶ Whaley, Bart and James Busby. “Detecting Deception: Practice, Practitioners, and Theory.”; Whaley, Barton. “Toward a General Theory of Deception.” John Gooch and Amos Perlmutter, eds. *Military Deception and Strategic Surprise*. London: Frank Cass, 1982. 178-192. ; Whaley, Barton. *Detecting Deception: A Bibliography of Counterdeception Across Time, Cultures, and Disciplines*. 2d ed. Washington, DC: Foreign Denial & Deception Committee, National Intelligence Council, Mar. 2006.

⁷ Monroe, James D. *Deception: Theory and Practice*. U.S. Naval Post-Graduate School, 2012.

⁸ Handel, Michael I. ed. *Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War*. Frank Cass, 1987.

⁹ Caddell, Joseph. *Deception 101: Primer on Deception*. Strategic Studies Dept., U.S. Army War College, 2003.

¹⁰ Latimer, Jon. *Deception in War*. The Overlook Press, Woodstock and New York. 2001.

¹¹ Heuer, R. J. (1981). “Strategic Deception and Counterdeception: A Cognitive Process Approach.” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 294-327.

¹² Colonel Michael Dewar, *The Art of Deception in Warfare*, Newton Abbot, Devon, UK: David & Charles Publishers, 1989, pp. 9-22



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purposes of this paper, two specific studies will be highlighted because of their inductive approach and identification of axioms. The first one extrapolates some general principles from a detailed case study analysis of World War II, and the second is a more quantitative example that makes a strong argument that deception should be a desired element of all operational planning because it is a medium of 'surprise.'

Where it concerns the study of deception, WWII represents the doctrinal beginnings of joint warfare,¹³ joint operational planning, and by proxy joint deception planning. The joint planning deception skills honed in the various theatres of WWII form the basis for many of the modern theoretical conceptualizations of military deception, and with good reason. WWII saw deceptions employed in varying degrees of intensity, across a wide variety of situations and opposing military formations. WWII is essentially a treasure trove of real life deception case studies from which to distill general principles that can assist in the communication of deception know-how to the next generations. For example, from Holts' WWII historical deception book *The Deceivers*¹⁴ the following set of principles were produced:

"Commandments of Deception"

- 1) Your goal is not to make the enemy think something; it is to make the enemy do something. (It is not psyops.)
- 2) You want your enemy not only to do something— but do something specific.
- 3) It is not necessary to make your enemy believe in the false state of affairs that you want to project; but it is enough to make the enemy so concerned over the likelihood that he feels that he must provide for it.
- 4) Non-action is a form of action; the decision to do nothing is still a decision.
- 5) The decision maker(s) are the targets of deception, the intelligence services are the customers of deception.

¹³ Synchronize of all services capabilities, four most commoner Land, Sea, Air, and SOF – and Space - if you have it.

¹⁴ Holt, Thaddeus: *The Deceivers, Allied Military Deception in the Second World War*. Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2004



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Not only are these principles easy to communicate, they are relevant to the full spectrum of modern warfare from the conventional battlespace environments, to the more asymmetrical and complex battlespace environments. Though to be discussed shortly in more detail with regards to creativity and innovation, one can immediately determine from generic parameters of these principles, that there is nothing to doctrinally quash creativity and innovation. Quite the opposite when using words 'something' to describe deception actions.

Quantitatively Speaking

Social science methodologies dealing with causal relationships have also had time to examine the effects of deception on military operations as well as to help distill generic principles to guide intelligence deception planners. One of the most accessible studies as to the effects of employing deception in operational and strategic level military planning is Barton Whaley's *Stratagem, Deception and Surprise in War*.¹⁵ By drawing on the comparative analysis of 122 historic cases, he produces results that clearly indicate there is a clear relationship between deception, surprise, and operational success.

Some of the principles quantitatively distilled by this study include:

1. Successful deception increases the intensity of surprise.
2. Higher intensity of surprise higher the chance of operational success.
3. Higher intensity of surprise means higher enemy casualties and lower friendly casualties.

¹⁵ Whaley, Barton. *Stratagem, Deception and Surprise in War*. Cambridge Mass: Center for Int. Studies, MIT Press, 1969.



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Fig. 2.0 Key Whaley Results (reproduced in tables)

Surprise vs. Deception vs. Casualties

	Number of Cases	Average Casualty Ratios
Surprise with Deception	59	1: 6.3
Surprise without Deception	20	1: 2.0
No Surprise with Deception	5	1: 1.3
No Surprise without Deception	40	1: 1.1
Total:	122	

Effect of surprise intensity on casualties

Intensity of Surprise	Average Casualty Ratios
0 (Low)	1: 1.1
1	1: 1.7
2	1: 4.5
3	1: 5.4
4	1: 4.1
5 (High)	1: 11.5

Intensity of Surprise vs. Outcome

Intensity of surprise		0 (LOW)	1	2	3	4	5 (HIGH)
	OUTCOME	No. / %	No. / %	No. / %	No. / %	No. / %	No. / %
	Defeat	35 / 59.3	4 / 25.0	5 / 11.9	0 / 0.0	1 / 6.2	0 / 0.0
	Well below expectations	14 / 23.7	2 / 12.5	9 / 21.4	6 / 20.7	5 / 31.3	1 / 20.0
	As expected	9 / 15.3	6 / 37.5	21 / 50.0	15 / 51.7	4 / 25.0	1 / 20.0
	Above Expectations	1 / 1.7	4 / 25.0	7 / 16.7	8 / 27.6	6 / 37.5	3 / 60.0
	TOTALS	59 / 100.0	16 / 100.0	42 / 100.0	29 / 100.0	16 / 100.0	5 / 100.0

Of the 59 battles fought without any initial surprise only 2% substantially exceeded its generals expectations while 60% ended in abject failure.

Of the 50 battles where surprise was intense (3-5 on the scale) 34% far exceeded their expectations and only 2% ended in defeat.

Not only did this study illustrate how social science methodologies can be applied to studies of military operations and deceptions in an extremely enlightening manner, it also bridges the theory practice divide by producing well-argued axioms for education and research programs. Axioms that can be challenged and refined through further research. He also indirectly engages the act of deception into the world of ethics. Specifically his conclusion that could only mean to increase your chance of success, you should use deception to increase



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levels of surprise and reduce friendly casualties. Therefore to incorporate deception into operational planning takes on moral overtones, for example, does not a Commander owe as much to his troops in order to keep more of them alive?

The ‘Art’ of Military Deception

On its most conceptual level, one could say deception is an art because it inherently relies on subjectivity, perceptions, and interpretations. Moreover, within processes of building and executing a deception plan, one can identify dogmatic principles resulting from one’s own organizational planning doctrine and routines. Often the stringent hierarchal military organizational culture is locked in a perpetual tug of war with more conceptual facets of deception planning, those that reflect creativity, social ethics, an morality. Promoting creativity is simply not high on the prioritization list of things to teach recruits at boot camp. It is no easy task to be part of a relatively rigid military organisation culture and promote the qualities of creativity and innovation. Furthermore “beauty” is indeed in the eye of the beholder, yet in the art of war, and the staff, ‘beauty’ is usually not word most feel comfortable using to describe a deception plan that led to a higher number of enemy killed in the battlespace. Yet it cannot be denied that when it comes to studying military deception, understanding the creativity behind deception planning could be explored at a post-graduate level.


Like artistic painting, the process of deception planning has two main components open to interpretation and subjective creativity, the process and the product. The process for the artist involves conceptualising the blank canvass and the choosing of paints, brushes, and strokes to be used. Their product is the completed painting. Both components are largely conceptual and interpretive. With deception planning, the blank canvasses are the different situations in which a Commander must generate a deception plan for. Consider Bartons 122 case studies, each deception plan generated for each battlespace is driven by the subjective conceptualisation of the battlespace – the blank canvass. It is not likely that one could historically find two situations in which deceptions have been exercised that are exactly the same. They are, like a blank canvases, fully open to perceptions and interpretations of the Commander in that situation. In the various situations during WWII where deception was used, it was not so much the case of the situation dictating a particular deception plan, but rather



how individual Commanders understood their situation that drove the creativity behind the deception plan. The Commanders deception planning will ultimately be driven by the Commanders *situational understanding*¹⁶ developed from intelligence and operational reporting. Situational understanding is therefore an important interpretive concept that facilitates bridging between deception theory and practice. Every blank canvass for a painter is the start to a different painting, every battlespace situation will be the starting point to a different deception plan driven by the conceptualisations of the Commander.

Like the selection of materials for painting, the planning process is also important to deception. Already in the literature there is no shortage of taxonomies for deception techniques. The techniques are always open to further experiment, development, and discovery. The study of military deception to date has varying degrees of granularity, in some cases like Monroe’s taxonomy presented below (See Fig. 3.0) , it is a simple mallet of from which a planner can mix and match in accordance with their own interpretation of the situation.

Fig. 3.0 Monroe’s Taxonomy of Deception Tools



¹⁶ James D. Monroe: *Deception: Theory and Practice*



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This simple taxonomy and toolbox comes with its own definitions that delineated the action relative to supporting a deception. For example:

- 1) **Active Deception:** Displaying, feinting, demonstrating and misinforming the ‘false’ is called “Active Camouflage”¹⁷ Display is divided into simulation and portrayal. Simulation uses decoys to create a dummy force or capability. Portrayal is an actual unit that appears it to be something else; like a force with a different size, or a force with a different capability. Feinting differentiates from demonstrations and display, in that the force seeks contact with the opponent. Demonstrations can be a show of force, like a feint but where contact with the opponent is not sought. Disinformation is about feeding false or selectively true information to the opponent in order to deceive.¹⁸
- 2) **Cover:** Known as passive deception or passive camouflage. Cover is about hiding the real and involves camouflage and denial.¹⁹ Camouflage includes hiding, blending, disguising and securing, while denial deny the opponent access and knowledge about your capabilities or objectives.

However the comparison to painting here takes an interesting divergence, where the moral and ethical conflicts related to painting are usually generated by the final product, for deception planners questions of ethics, morals, and judicial prudence, surround primarily the methods chosen for generating a deception plan. Precisely, the judicial framework for military deception planning stems primarily from the source of law for international armed conflict such as the Geneva conventions I, II, III and IV from 1949, The Hague Convention on the regulation of land warfare from 1907, and international customary law.²⁰ Needless to say there are grounds to believe that any post-graduate courses on military deception that studies the tools of deception,

¹⁷ James Caddell “Deception 101” p. 8

¹⁸ James Monroe, “Deception: Theory and Practice”, p. 45-48 and Barton Whaley, “Strategem; Deception and Surprise in War” p. 7

¹⁹ James Caddell, “Deception 101” p. 17-19 and Thaddeus Holt, “The deceivers” p. 53

²⁰ Alina Kaczorowska; “Public International Law” p. 35



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will have plenty of material to explore with regards to the moral, ethical and judicial aspects of military deception planning. For example, for many countries there could be an obligation for it's military to deceive 'humanely.'

To summarize Part I, there is sufficient literature to provide a serious discussion on the philosophy of science surrounding the study of military deception. Moreover, there is little doubt that it can also carry a post-graduate research agenda with a broad spectrum of facets available for further conceptualisation and interpretation. It easily engages a broad range of middle theories that will likely stretch from the study of psychology, international relations, strategic studies, military and politics, historical method, to ethics and international law. Of course middle range theories have their own meta-theoretical foundations, and therefore it is very likely cases of military deception can be used to illustrate more philosophical or worldview perspectives. It can be approached methodologically as a science or creatively as an operational art. Part II of the paper dives into the greater granularity surrounding the integration of military deception into current military intelligence education training for application in the battlespace and warfighting.

PART 2 – Military Intelligence and the Practice of Deception

The post-9-11 intelligence studies 'awakening' period has provided an expanded foundation for the discovery of new practical relationships between intelligence, operations, and deception. Though the doctrinal bridges between operations and deception, or operations and intelligence, are existent in various doctrines and field manuals, they lack theoretical depth. That said, the bridge between intelligence and deception is far less developed on all fronts. In any final deception course structure, we would have to account for bridge building between the practice of battlespace intelligence and battlespace deception. And do so within the context of Danish warfighting doctrine that calls for balance between doctrine, organisation, and technology in order to facilitate battlespace agility. This would require choosing a theoretical framework already familiar to Danish operational and intelligence planners for managing the



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battlespace, in order to provide a familiar platform from which general principles and practices could be easily communicated. Some of the criteria included for the selection of the theoretical model from which to develop practices were:

- 1) For the Intelligence department (the 2 shop), the theoretical framework would have to be able to engage Robert Clark's network centric approach²¹ (or 'object based production'), as well as, the traditional intelligence cycle. (These are the two existing intelligence process models taught within the Danish military intelligence organization.)
- 2) For the Operational silo (the 3 shop) it had to be able to be communicated within a warfighting context that accounts for adversaries, while at the same time facilitating on a generic level²² the engagement of existing military intelligence doctrine and command decision processes.

Fortunately one decision making model was already being used as the theoretical framework surrounding the bridging of intelligence and operations, and adapted version of Boyd's OODA loop, so it was more a question of if we could use this adapted OODA framework for deep diving on integrating deception practice, within regards to both intelligence and operations in warfare.

The OODA Loop and Deception

Operate inside the adversary's observation-orientation-decision-action loops to enmesh adversary in a world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic chaos, ... and /or fold the adversary back inside himself, so that he cannot cope with events/efforts as they unfold." (Be faster in thought and action.)

Bodnar (2003) Joint Military Intelligence College

²¹ Robert Clark & William L. Mitchell, Target Centric Network Modelling. CQ-SAGE, 2015

²² 'Generic' as the Danish military intelligence capability is often plugged into different doctrinal sets such as the UK, USA, or NATO.




In order to begin building the bridge between deception theory and practice within a context of warfighting, we need to plant the pillars that will hold the bridge. Deception is not executed for the sake of deception but is always part of some context where there will be the deceivers, and the deceived. Therefore deception can only be successful, or unsuccessful, relative to an actors decision-making process (yours or your adversaries) and therefore need a decision-making model that can be applied to processes of both the deceiver and the intended deceived. In short, we need a framework for the integrating the intricate “how to do” processes for both friend and foe within the context of intelligence driven operations.

OODA in the Intelligence and Operational Planning Environment

In our experience OODA has proven itself particularly well-suited to framing intelligence/operational planning process issues. This is because the different stages in the OODA loop can be related to the generic intelligence an operations planning structures of most military organizations and doctrines. For example, the observation and orient stage obviously has something to do with intelligence collection and analysis, operations concerns the act phase, and of course, the Commander where it concerns deciding (See Fig. 4.0 below.)

Fig. 4.0 Adapted OODA



Robert Clark & William L. Mitchell, Target Centric Network Modelling. CQ-SAGE, 2015



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The model can manage the generic processes associated with intelligence and operations and is thereby advantageous for education endeavours. By hitting the right generic level of the model, it can be used for explaining more theoretical aspects as well as practical applications. In Fig. 4.0 above, at the centre you can see two avenues for theoretical discussion: shared situational understanding introduced earlier, it is an official NATO cognitive measurement of performance and gateway to philosophical discussions on sense-making; and Target Network Modelling, a hands on approach for communicating situational understanding in an operational staff. The key to how we bridge the theory-practice divide specifically where it concerns military deception, lies in the fact that the model, can be applied not only subjectively, but also objectively - to adversaries. This creates a framework for explaining deception in warfighting specifically where it concerns the roles of intelligence and operational planning relative to the adversary. Quite simply it can be used to orient both the theoretical and practical facets of military deception in a battlespace. So in a sense, already here, we have powerful educational tool for use in post-graduate courses. It will literally act as the hub or junction between theoretical discussions on deception, and their conversion to the practice of deception in a fight. The following sections present an example of how this could work.

From Theory to Practice Example

“Collecting for Deception”

Social Theory and Deception’s 3 OODAs

In Ted Hopf’s 1998 *The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory*²³ he offered a conventional constructivist understanding of identity that would, over the last 15 years end up providing a middle theoretical foundation for the Danish²⁴ Defence to engage complex battlespaces. Sometimes intentionally and sometimes unknowingly but making significant contributions to how modern warfare will be fought by Danish Defence. Some of the

²³ Hopf, Ted. “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory” *International Security* 23:1/171-200.

²⁴ It should be noted here that around 1998 Copenhagen University International Politics Dept. was internationally tagged as developing the Copenhagen School of constructivism under Ole Weaver and Barry Buzan that grappled with the application of constructivist thinking to security policy analysis. It was inevitable that elements of this work would spread into of Defence academics and eventually to the battlespaces of the 21st century.



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doctrinal pieces developed include normative warfare, human terrain mapping, and pattern of life analysis for use of everything from designing aid packages, to more effective kinetic targeting. Taking identities more concretely also improved the operational planning assessment process to account for eventual effects of actions in the battlespace.²⁵ It also acted often as the middle theory go between for the meta-theoretical constructivist dynamic of intersubjectivity and understanding the necessity for managing the physical and cognitive domains of the modern battlespace. Once again it will be drawn on to assist in bridging the theory-practice divide, this time in terms of understanding the dynamics of deception in a battlespace within the OODA framework.

To understand the dynamics of deception to the degree where you can pursue practical activities to support it, you need to grasp three OODA perspectives that mirror Hopfs understanding of identity:

- 1) How you see you see your own OODA.
- 2) How you see your adversaries OODA.
- 3) How you think your adversaries OODA sees your OODA. (Essence of deception)

Perspective 1 – How you understand your own OODA loop.


This perspective is the most commonly understood application of the OODA loop. It entails looking your own organization and understanding how the structures and processes belonging to that organization affect that way it observes, orients, decides, and acts in a given situation. Understanding ones' own OODA loop is not only necessary for deception planning , but it should be a must for operational planning in general. This entails sensor mapping how you observe in the operational environment and your adversaries. It means having an intimate knowledge with how your organisation orients and processes the information, and the challenges within the organisation with regards to speed and precision. Just as important is

²⁵Mitchell, William L. The Agility Imperative: A Revelation in Military Affairs 14 Jun 2013 Issue 1 Volume 1 ed., Copenhagen: Forsvarsakademiets Forlag, p. 1-5 5 p.; Operationalizing Battlespace Agility 30 Jan 2013 In : Militaert Tidsskrift. 141, 4, p. 78-95 17 p; Instrumental Friend or Foe?: Constructivist Activism in Security Means Analysis . 2004 Politica, Conclusion;



understanding how that development and exploitation of that information affects the decisions made and actions taken.

Fig. 5.0 Understand Your Own OODA Loop



Perspective 2 - Understand the Adversaries OODA loop


In order to get inside the adversaries OODA loop you must understand how they observe in their operational environment. Therefore sensor mapping your adversary is the key to understanding how to build up a deception operation. You must understand how they collect information, and all the classified (ex.IMINT) and unclassified (ex. OSINT) platforms they might have. Identify all the adversaries lawful and unlawful collection sources and sensors. Just as important is understanding how your adversary orients the information collected, primarily try to understand what they want to collect on and how they collate it. Essentially try and track their intelligence collection planning. Understanding this, will enable you to understand how they make decisions and execute actions.



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Fig. 6.0 Understand the Adversarial OODA Loop



Perspective 3 – Understand how the adversaries understand your OODA Loop


Establishing this perspective to any level of usefulness is important to both deception planning and deception detection. Essentially it requires that you have the first two OODA perspectives established. Once you have them you should have sufficient grounds to estimate who your adversaries understands your observation capability, your orienting process, and the resulting decisions and actions. It is your estimate of the adversary's estimate of your own OODA loop. The contribution to deception planning of this perspective is primarily allowing you to increase deception operational security – knowing what indicators to avoid to trigger that might trigger the curiosity of your adversary as to what you are really planning. Where it concerns deception detection, it will facilitate you looking for incongruences and congruencies in the information your sensors are collected that might indicate you are in fact being deceived.



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


Fig. 7.0 Understand How the Adversary Understands OODA Loop



So just how does one work with it at the lowest practical level? It will have to take the form of standard operating procedures (SOPs) designed to guide application within the staff headquarters in both the intelligence and operations departments (the 2 & 3 shop). The following is an example of possible a SOP in very informal descriptive format. It also represents the final stage of our requirements for post-graduate deception courses, whereby the bridge between theory and practice is crossed, and tri-partite relationship between intelligence, operations, and deception planning is manageable. An example is presented below.

Fig. 8.0 Sensor Model Your Adversarial Observe





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
- How do they observe their environment?
- How do they maintain situational awareness?
- How do they get feedback?
- What are restrictions/blindspots/weaknesses?

In order to effectuate any deception, you must have an understanding of your adversaries capabilities for observing their operational environment, because it will be these sensors or sources you will have to convince of something. Within an OODA loop understanding it requires that you model the 'observe' phase of your adversaries' loop in order to eventually manipulate their OODA loop and decision making process. If you are seriously to engage in deception, you must set both collection and analytical resources aside to target model the adversaries collection capabilities. Not only to develop a fundamental knowledge as to what types of sensors the adversary has available to them in any given operational environment, but also to develop understandings of any timelines or time restrictions related to the different sensors. There is no point making a great effort to deceive a sensor if it is not turned on or in use.

The process of identifying adversarial sensors can involve a variety of methods that stretch from actual experimentation and in depth research as to what adversaries had before the conflict, to targeted collection and general knowledge. It could be simple like the few lines written by a patrol leader in their report that refer to "enemy roving patrols" at a specific time and place (the enemy patrol is therefore an adversarial sensor for exploitation), to something more complicated like working out the orbital iterations of adversarial satellite over the area of interest or operations. It could also be the social network surrounding 'legal' spies in your country, such as military attaches, or maybe more clandestine 'illegal' HUMINT networks. An example is presented in Fig. 9.0.




Fig. 9.0 Example - Sensor Mapping the Roberts Narco Clan



This is the end of the little case study example that should have took you all the way from the social theory to the types of ITSAR one has in the battlespace, and what you need to do with them with regards to intelligence collection to support deception planning. The key for us is the adapted OODA loop acts as a hub (see Fig. 10.0 below) for our deception courses concept, facilitating the synthesis of theory and practice, and deception with intelligence and operations in the battlespace.

Fig. 10.0 Concept for Military Deception Courses Revisited





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CONCLUSION

In order for post-graduate deception courses to be developed within the intelligence studies program of the Danish Defence, several requirements would have to be fulfilled in terms of theory and practice while ensuring eventual impact on actual warfighting. The key to the post-graduate theoretical affirmation was the degree to which military deception studies could bear theoretical and philosophical reflections. Our findings were surprisingly supportive of there being more than enough interesting facets to deception. It is a planning medium that is largely interpretive, produces largely conceptual products, and engages both the physical and cognitive dimensions of a battlespace, including the dynamic (intersubjective) relationship between them. At the same time our findings also indicated there would be no difficulties bridging the theory-practice divide with our adapted OODA loop. It is also very likely other competitive decision-making models can be used as a framework for eventual courses on the dynamics of deception. So yes military deception is an art, and it is worthy of post-graduate study. The role of intelligence studies in this is to manage the synthesis between intelligence, deception, and operations, as well ensure the theory-practice relationship can be communicated to post-graduate students in a manner that is academically fitting, while promoting military effectiveness in the battlespace.